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APPORTIONMENT OF LOSSES UNDER
COMPARATIVE FAULT LAWS-AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES
Richard N. Pearson*
When the Louisiana legislature, toward the close of its last ses-
sion, enacted a comparative negligence statute of general applicabil-
ity,' it fell into line with a majority of the states.2 Comparative
negligence does seem to be an idea whose time has come, and there
is little serious debate today as to the superiority of comparative
negligence over the doctrine of contributory negligence that it
replaces.' Contributory negligence has few defenders.
But comparative negligence is not a unitary concept. In fact,
there are about as many different comparative negligence schemes
as there are jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negli-
gence.4 Thus, a number of choices are available with respect to how
losses can be apportioned among the parties in addition to the
method presented in the Louisiana statute just enacted. At the
same time the statute was passed, the legislature adopted a concur-
rent resolution authorizing a thoroughgoing study of comparative
negligence5 and, to that end, postponed the effective date of the
*Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431.
2. Thirty-five states now have comparative negligence laws of general applicabil-
ity. Six of these states, Alaska, California, Florida, Michigan, Tennessee, and West
Virginia, have judicially created their laws. See Kaatz v. Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas.
1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975);
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405
Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919);
Chandler v. Nolen, 50 Tenn. App. 49, 359 S.W.2d 591 (1961); Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
3. For a good review of the arguments, see Schwartz, Contributory and Com-
parative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978).
4. It is too early to tell whether the recently completed Uniform Comparative
Fault Act will provide the impetus toward uniformity. I suspect not. In the first place,
it provides for pure comparative negligence, when the clear preference by legislatures
so far is for modified comparative negligence. See text at notes 34-37, infra. Secondly,
it is unlikely that many legislatures .that have already enacted comparative negligence
laws will reconsider them with a view toward enacting the Uniform Act. And finally,
the Uniform Act resolves many issues as to which there is likely to be considerable
disagreement, even if agreement could be reached on the pure form of comparative
negligence proposed by the Act. In an area in which state-to-state uniformity is not
likely to be perceived by legislatures as particularly important, some variation among
the states as to peripheral matters can be expected. For the text of the Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act, see the appendix to this symposium, infra p. 419.
5. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 266, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
comparative negligence law to August 1, 1980.6 This indicates a
legislative willingness to consider afresh the full gamut of issues
presented by the comparative negligence concept. It will be helpful,
then, to discuss methods of apportioning losses other than those em-
bodied in the present Louisiana legislation.
The basic purpose of comparative negligence7 laws is to amelio-
rate the all-or-nothing harshness of the contributory negligence doc-
trine. Thus, comparative negligence serves as a system of apportion-
ing losses between plaintiff and defendant when both are negligent.
The two basic systems of apportioning losses are pure comparative
negligence and modified comparative negligence. Cutting across
both of these are problems of set-off and of derivative actions-
those for loss of consortium and wrongful death. The principle upon
which apportionment of losses between plaintiff and defendant is
based-that liability should be proportioned to negligence-has im-
plications not only for loss apportionment between plaintiff and
defendant, but among defendants as well. The traditional doctrines
that are affected are those of joint and several liability and of con-
tribution. The comparative negligence principle can also affect the
rules relating to settlements. But before turning to an analysis of
the various approaches to loss apportionment under comparative
negligence, two important collateral issues must be discussed: (1)
what is it that is to be compared-negligence or causation, and (2)
how the shares of negligence are to be calculated.
From the legislators' point of view, transcending all of these
issues is how much detail should go into a comparative negligence
statute. Statutes and proposals vary widely in their specificity. The
6. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 7.
7. The Louisiana statute, for reasons that are not clear to me, refers to the
"negligence" of the plaintiff, but to the "fault" of the defendant. This may be due to
the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted "fault" as used in article
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code as embracing strict liability-or at least liability with-
out negligence-in some cases. See, e.g., Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976). It
thus might have been the intent of the Louisiana legislature (1) to apply the compara-
tive negligence principle to cases in which the defendant's liability under article 2315
is strict as well as negligence; and (2) to distinguish between negligence and such
"strict liability" fault when the conduct of the plaintiff is being judged, with the plain-
tiff's recovery being reduced only by his negligence, and not by his "strict liability"
fault, if any. If so, this would produce a rather bizarre result in cases in which both
parties suffer loss, and the basis of liability of one is strict. The "strict liability" fault
of that party would be used in calculating the other party's recovery, but not in reduc-
ing his recovery. In any event, in this article the word "negligence" will be used to
avoid confusion with the broader concept of fault. But since in other jurisdictions, fault
and negligence are used interchangeably, some of the material quoted may use "fault"
in the narrower sense. For a discussion of the applicability of comparative negligence
to strict liability cases, see Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability,
40 LA. L. REv. 403 (1980).
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New Hampshire law as originally passed, for example, was contained
in a single paragraph of twelve-and-a-half lines.8 The proposed Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, on the other hand, comes with six sec-
tions of substantive provisions, some of them rather lengthy. If the
legislature is to act at all, some basic choices of course must be
made; the choice between pure and modified comparative negligence
cannot be left to later adjudication. But the more detailed a pro-
posal, the longer the legislative process will take and the more dif-
ficult it will be to enact the proposal. Conversely, the simpler the
proposal the less need there is for agreement on specifics and the
easier the legislative process is likely to become. But this would in-
volve reliance upon the uncertainties of later adjudication to fill in
the details. In any event, the discussion of a particular problem is
not meant to suggest that the legislature should address and resolve
that problem-silence on some points raised in this article, and
others beyond its scope, may be the wisest legislative choice.
GENERAL PROBLEMS
This section will address two matters of a general nature that
are relevant to the apportionment of losses among the parties and
that arise regardless of which system of comparative negligence is
adopted.
What is to be Compared -Negligence or Causation
The problem of what is to be compared, negligence or causation,
may be more a problem of semantics than substance,9 but it de-
serves brief mention here. The commentators are divided upon the
issue. Dean Prosser asserted that "once causation is found, the ap-
8. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1969). A shorter paragraph was added in 1971
to deal with the effect of releases. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-b (1971).
9. The negligence or causation debate may take on more meaning when the basis
of the defendant's liability is strict, and there is no negligence on his part against
which the negligence of the plaintiff can be compared. The non-comparability of negli-
gence and strict liability has led some courts to reject comparative negligence in strict
liability cases, at least in the absence of statutory directives to the contrary. See, e.g.,
Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.,
521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). Other courts, either under comparative negligence statutes
or apart from them, have developed notions of "comparative causation" in strict liabil-
ity cases. See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed Prentice Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374
N.E.2d 437 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 849 (N.H. 1978); General
Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). Philosophically, of course, it makes no
more sense to speak of comparative causation in strict liability cases than it does in
negligence cases-causation is not a matter of degree. See text at notes 11-13, infra.
This does not mean that reducing the plaintiffs recovery in strict liability cases is an
anomaly, rather that it cannot be done on the basis of comparing causation as such.
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portionment must be on the basis of comparative fault, rather than
on the basis of comparative contribution."1 Taking the other side,
Professor- Twerski suggests that "comparative negligence is less a
strict comparison of fault than it is a kind of homespun judgment
that the plaintiff should have his verdict reduced by what the jury
considers to be an amount reflecting his participation in the
injury."'" The reality is that both causation and negligence are rele-
vant-to liability, but what is to be compared is negligence and not
causation. Causation is not a relative concept; it exists or it does
not, and if it does exist one does not speak of "degrees" of causa-
tion." On the other hand, it is not the "moral blameworthiness" of
10. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 481 (1953). See also
Pan-Alaskan Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. and Design Co., 402 F. Supp. 1187, 1188
(W.D. Wash. 1975) ("Culpability, not causation, is the standard by which damages are
assessed in comparative negligence cases.").
11. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some
Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297, 326 (1977). Section 2(b) of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act also seems to suggest that causation can be compared
by making "the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages"
relevant to determining the "percentages of fault."
12. Dean Prosser has stated:
Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what has in fact occurred. A cause is a
necessary antecedent: in a very real and practical sense, the term embraces all
things which have so far contributed to the result that without them would not
have occurred ....
[A]n act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular
event would have occurred without it.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 237-38 (4th ed. 1971). This quotation, and the discussion in
the text, refer to "cause-in-fact," which is only one of a number of concepts that carry
the label "cause." See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71-73 (1975).
Often, commentators who suggest that cause-in-fact can be compared speak of
causation in a different context than referred to above. Thus, when Hart and Honore
speak of "degrees of causation," it is clear that they refer to cases in which effects are
separable. They use as an example the assertion, "The main ... cause of ... his suc-
cess as a miler was his assiduous training." H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW 214 (1959). Assiduous training does not enable one to run a mile-anyone who is
otherwise able can do that. The training does enable one to run a mile faster than
otherwise. When effects are separable, the law does divide liability upon the basis of
cause. For example, a plaintiff who is injured in an automobile accident may not be
able to recover for the increment in harm attributable to his failure to wear seat belts.
See Yocco v. Barris, 16 I1. App. 3d 113, 305 N.E.2d 584 (1973); Spier v. Barker, 35
N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974).
In another context, Professor Twerski has observed that "as a statement of fact
and pure logic, it is clear that cause-in-fact is not subject to apportionment." Twerski,
The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative
Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403, 413 (1978). He then suggests that in cases in which
the causal connection is uncertain, juries, in assessing damages, could consider "the
likelihood at a percentage basis that a party's activities caused harm." Id. This is quite
different, of course, from saying that loss can be apportioned between two or more ac-
tual causes of harm.
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the parties that is to be assessed, 3 nor even the parties' negligence
in the abstract, but rather the negligence that contributes to the ac-
cident. The plaintiff, or the defendant, may be negligent in the crea-
tion of risks that do not result in harm; if that happens, that
negligence is not taken into account. 4 If the negligence has con-
tributed to the accident-that is, has caused it-then it is that
negligence which is to be compared, and none other.
This may call for some precision in identifying the negligent acts
which are to be compared. For example, if the plaintiff is intoxicated
while driving his automobile, he certainly would be negligent-in-
deed perhaps very negligent. But that negligence as such will be ir-
relevant to his recovery if he is otherwise lawfully proceeding
through an intersection and is struck by the defendant who is
speeding and running a stop sign. The plaintiff's intoxication did not
cause the accident. Even if it could be argued that the plaintiff could
have avoided the accident by maintaining a reasonable lookout, it is
the failure to maintain that lookout and not the intoxication that is
the relevant act of negligence that must be compared. 5
The Louisiana statute calls for a reduction in damages based
upon the "negligence attributable" to the plaintiff, which is the
phraseology used in most statutes. 7 While this manner of expression
is suitably vague, it is not inconsistent with the above analysis.
How the Shares of Negligence are to be Calculated
The difficulties inherent in comparing negligence have led one
judge to lament that comparative negligence "not only invites but
demands arbitrary determinations by judges and juries, turning
them free to allocate loss as their sympathies direct."' 8 One need not
At a more philosophical level, see the debate between Professors Epstein and
Borgo in Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 165, 179-80 (1974), and Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 419, 448-52 (1979).
13. See Fleming, Forward. Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice,
64 CAL. L. REV. 239, 249 (1976).
14. This is the traditional rule of proximate cause. If the negligence has not fac-
tually contributed to the harm, it is not a basis for imposing liability upon the defen-
dant or for barring the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
15. This view is supported, in somewhat different terms, by Fleming, supra note
13, at 241; James, Connecticut's Comparative Negligence Statute: An Analysis of
Some Problems, 6 CONN. L. REV. 207, 217 (1973-74).
16. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1, amending LA. CiV. CODE art. 2323.
17. See H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE- COMPARATIVE FAULT app. (1978) (state-
by-state summary of comparative fault laws).
18. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 616, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 206-07, 578 P.2d 899, 924 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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share this despair entirely to agree that the calculation of the
shares of negligence is no easy and clean-cut task. One way to han-
dle the problem is to accept the imponderable nature of share calcu-
lation and to submit the issue to the jury under very general in-
structions with the hope that the jury will get the basic idea of what
to do. This appears to have been the choice of the New Hampshire
legislature in expressly providing that damages are to be awarded
by general verdict. 9 Indeed, one of the sponsors of the New Hamp-
shire statute confessed as much in print:
Entrusting the entire process of dollar damages apportion-
ment to the jury under general verdict procedures will strike
some as an act of faith bordering on irresponsibility. [But as the
bill worked its way through the legislative proccess] the realiza-
tion grew that the rough and basic justice of unfettered jury
deliberation was probably preferable (at least worth a good try)
as an alternative to the horrendous mathematical processes
described by opponents of the legislation as necessarily a part of
the jury's function under special verdict statutes. Most of those
involved in the jury trial process, it is submitted, would agree
on reflection that New Hampshire juries are populated in the
main by neither misers nor spendthrifts. Others, with much in
the way of research and experience to draw from, agree on the
fundamental fairness and good sense of the average juror. °
Even when a special verdict is used the jury may receive little use-
ful guidance. For example, the Louisiana comparative negligence
statute instructs judges sitting with juries to use special verdicts, in
which juries are to determine, as to each person involved, the
"degree of fault, expressed as a percentage."'" This, of course, tells
juries very little as to what is the intellectual process of calculating
the degree of fault.
One method of conceptualizing the share of the negligence attri-
butable to each party is to imagine a "fault line," with the absence
of fault at one end having a value of zero and deliberate wrongdoing
at the other having a value of ten. The fact finder would then estab-
19. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977).
20. Nixon, The Actual "Legislative Intent" Behind New Hampshire's Compara-
tive Negligence Statute, 12 N.H.B.J. 17, 30 (1969).
21. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 2, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1811. "Fault" is
the word used in reference to the conduct of those whose conduct caused the plaintiffs
harm. "Negligence" is the word used with reference to the plaintiff's conduct. See note
7, supra.
22. Even the Uniform Comparative Fault Act is very general. Section 2 simply
provides that the trier of fact is to calculate the "percentage of the total fault of all of
the parties."
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lish where on this line the conduct of each party falls. As an exam-
ple, assume a three person case, with each negligent to some
degree. The jury might find the negligence of one person to fall at
seven on the ten point scale, the second at two, and the third at
four. The share of the negligence of the first would be 7/13 or 54%,
of the second 2/13 or 15%, and of the third 4/13 or 31%. This analy-
sis suggests a precision that probably would not be supportable by
the evidence in many cases,23 and it is not suggested that the "fault
line" method either be incorporated into a statute or precisely in
this form into the jury instructions. But it does provide a means of
visualizing the fact finder's task, which perhaps could be put into a
useful form. 4 In any event, the nature of the fact finder's task could
be defined more particularly than it is in the Louisiana statute,
although this is one matter that might safely be left to the delibera-
tion of the courts.
METHODS OF LOSS APPORTIONMENT
The following discussion presents an analysis of the methods of
apportioning losses between plaintiff and, defendant, as well as
among defendants. As will become readily apparent, the central
theme of the instant analysis is what this writer perceives to be the
central theme of comparative negligence: liability should be based
upon the shares of negligence attributable to those causing harm.
Although this characterization of the central theme of comparative
23. But see Kampman v. Dunham, 560 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1977). In Kampman, the jury
was able to detect a 1% share of the negligence attributable to one of the defendants.
24. An approach of this sort was suggested in Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 500
(Me. 1973), when the court stated:
[Alpportionment is on the basis of fault or blame. This involves a comparison of
the culpability of the parties, meaning by culpability not moral blame but the
degree of departure from the standard of a reasonable man .... Comparison is in-
vited between degrees of fault which may range from trivial inadvertence to the
grossest recklessness .... In judging the conduct of an actor it should be con-
sidered complete carefulness is at one end, a deliberate intention to bring about
the result is at the other. Negligence ranges from the least blameworthy type,
namely, inadvertence and negligent errors of judgment up to a state where
knowledge or more complete knowledge supervenes and the negligence of
obstinacy, self-rightousness or reckless is reached. The factfinder must be told
then [sic] under our statute, it should give consideration to the relative blame-
worthiness of the causative fault of the claimant and of the defendant.
25. Judge Clark's characterization of comparative negligence as a "non-law
system," American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 616, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 207, 578 P.2d at 924 (Clark, J., dissenting), is probably the overreaction of a
judge hostile to comparative negligence in general and judicially-adopted comparative
negligence in particular. But surely his criticism warrants thoughtful consideration if
some method short of simple reliance upon the "fundamental fairness and good sense
of the average juror," Nixon, supra note 20, at 30, is to be attained.
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negligence would provoke little controversy, how the theme should
serve to guide the choices among the alternative methods of loss ap-
portionment, and even the rigor with which it should be adhered to,
are matters as to which there is much disagreement.
Loss Apportionment Between Plaintiff and Defendant
The principal systems of comparative negligence with respect to
loss apportionment between plaintiff and defendant are pure com-
parative negligence and modified comparative negligence. Under
pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced, but
not eliminated, by the share of negligence attributable to him,"6 until
that point has been reached at which the causal negligence is deter-
mined to be entirely allocable to the plaintiff, and none allocable to
the defendant. With this system, which is the one incorporated into
the Louisiana statute,27 a plaintiff whose share of the negligence is
99% can recover 1% of his damages. Under modified comparative
negligence, the plaintiff will be barred from recovering in some in-
stances in which less than all of the negligence is allocated to him.
Within this modified form of comparative negligence, there are two
sub-methods: one which bars the plaintiff's recovery when his negli-
gence is 50% or more of the total, and the other when his negli-
gence is 51% or more.28 Up to those percentages, modified compara-
tive negligence functions in the same way as the pure form in that
the plaintiff's damages are reduced by that portion of the negligence
attributable to him.
Before turning to a more detailed account of how these various
methods work, a word on the nature of the debate involved in the
choice between pure and modified comparative negligence systems
is in order. One argument that has often been advanced in favor of
26. In describing here the operation of comparative negligence to reduce the
plaintiff's recovery, it is assumed that only the plaintiff has suffered loss. If both plain-
tiff and defendant suffer loss, the recovery of each will be reduced, if set-off is re-
quired, by the amount of the recovery of the other as well as by his own negligence.
As to set-off, see text at notes 62-68, infra.
27. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
28. Other forms of modified comparative negligence include that of Nebraska and
South Dakota. The Nebraska statute calls for reduction of the plaintiff's damages by
the amount of negligence attributable to him when his "negligence is slight and the
negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison." NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151
(1975), South Dakota's statute is similar, calling for reduction of the damages when the
plaintiff's negligence is slight when compared to that of the defendant, whether the lat-
ter's negligence is gross or not. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967). Tennessee has
an even more unusual rule, under which the plaintiff's "remote" contributory negli-
gence reduces but does not eliminate his recovery. Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214
S.W. 869 (1919); Chandler v. Nolen, 50 Tenn. App. 49, 359 S.W.2d 591 (1961). These
methods are enough out of the mainstream to warrant only this passing reference.
[Vol. 40
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pure comparative negligence is its logical connection with the basic
idea of comparative negligence: the plaintiff should not be barred
from recovery by his own negligence; rather, his negligence should
serve only to reduce his recovery.29 Any rule which in some cases
totally precludes the plaintiff from recovering when his negligence
is less than 100% -even if it is more than that of others who have
caused his harm-is inconsistent with that idea. Another argument
emphasizes what is thought to be the basic fairness of pure com-
parative negligence, and is well stated by then Professor, now
United States District Judge, Robert Keeton:
The "pure" form of comparative negligence seems the superior
rule of apportionment. It is difficult to justify discriminating be-
tween the case in which the plaintiff is a little more negligent
than the defendant, and the case in which the defendant is a lit-
tle more negligent than the plaintiff. Apportionment seems a
fairer solution in both cases than making one party bear all his
own loss. Moreover, in one sense, the more limited form of com-
parative negligence would only aggravate this unfair discrimina-
tion if it really worked according to its theory, because the
party a little more negligent would bear all his own loss plus a
little more than half the loss flowing from the injury to the
other."0
Proponents of the modified comparative negligence system pro-
vide testimony as to the hardiness of the fault concept. A committee
of the American Bar Association was able to resolve the debate with
the brief observation that pure comparative negligence goes "too far
in abolishing fault as the basis for recovery."3 A sponsor of the New
Hampshire modified system, while recognizing the "logic" of pure
comparative negligence, asserted that his "'sandlot instinct' rebels
against the 'fairness' of a rule which would . . . permit any recovery
to the party found to be more at fault."32
Dean Prosser dismissed modified systems as
more or less obvious compromises between contesting groups in
the legislature which go part of the way along the road to appor-
tionment but endeavor to stop short at some point where the
distrust of the jury becomes acute,' or where agreement can be
reached. They are, in other words, political in character, and like
29. See Fleming, supra note 13, at 246-47.
30. Keeton, Comment on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 911 (1968).
31. REPORT OF THE A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATION
77 (1969).
32. Nixon, supra note 20, at 24-25.
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most political compromises, they are remarkable neither for
soundness in principle nor success in operation.3
These remarks no doubt understate the extent to which there is
support in principle for modified comparative negligence, as distinct
from opposition to pure comparative negligence. However, it is in-
teresting that courts, which are not so subject to short run political
pressures as are legislatures, have, when they have felt free to act
at all, by and large opted for the pure system. 4 Indeed, courts on oc-
casion have been critical of their own legislatively adopted modified
systems,35 to the point that at least one judge was prepared judi-
cially to adopt pure comparative negligence in spite of a modified
comparative negligence statute.36 Modified comparative negligence,
on the other hand, is the clear preference of state legislatures."
In analyzing how the two systems work, the simple case of a
two person accident, with one plaintiff and one defendant, provides
the most helpful example. But difficulties not present in the basic
two-party case may develop when there is more than one defendant.
Additionally, when more than one party has suffered loss, a special
problem arises, that of set-off. Finally, the circumstance in which the
plaintiff suffers harm because another person has been injured or
killed raises the possibility of "derivative" actions.
The Basic Two-Party Case
a) Under Pure Comparative Negligence
No particular problem is presented in apportioning the loss be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant under pure comparative negli-
gence. Under the Louisiana statute, for example, the plaintiff's
recovery is reduced by the "degree or percentage of negligence at-
tributable" to him. Thus, if a plaintiff were to have provable
damages of $10,000 and were determined to be responsible for 30%
33. Prosser, supra note 10, at 484.
34. The cases from Alaska, California, Florida, and Michigan are cited in note 2,
supra. The only judicially adopted modified comparative negligence laws are those of
West Virginia and Tennessee.
35. See, e.g., Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974).
36. See the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Hallows in Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54
Wis. 2d 415, 418, 195 N.W.2d 461, 462 (1972), and Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47
Wis. 2d 120, 131, 177 N.W.2d 513, 518 (1970).
37. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (1973); Mississippi, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-13 (McKinney 1975);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (1972); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.010 (1979); and now Louisiana are the only states to have legislatively adopted
pure comparative negligence.
38. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1, amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 2323.
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of the total negligence, with 70% attributable to the defendant, the
judge would enter a judgment of $7,000 for the plaintiff" ($10,000
less 30% of $10,000). If the shares of negligence were reversed, with
the plaintiff allocated 70% of the negligence and the defendant 30%,
the plaintiff's recovery would be $3,000. The same method of compu-
tation is used if both parties have suffered loss-each recovers from
the other his total damages reduced by his share of the negligence."
b) Under Modified Comparative Negligence
There are two main forms of modified comparative negligence,
and like pure comparative negligence, neither presents difficulties in
the basic two-party case. The older form, originally adopted by
Wisconsin4 and followed by a number of states,42 provides that the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall not be a bar to re-
covery if his negligence is not as great as that of the defendant.
Under this form, a plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50% of the
total can recover his loss reduced by his share of the negligence, but
if his negligence is 50% or more of the total, he cannot recover any-
thing. This is called the "50 percent bar." Under the more recent
form of modified comparative negligence, pioneered by New Hamp-
shire" and now followed by Wisconsin44 and other states,45 the plain-
tiff can recover so long as his negligence was not greater than that
of the defendant. Under this form, the plaintiff cannot recover only
when his negligence reaches 51% of the total; this is known as the
"51 percent bar."46 Theoretically, increasing the plaintiff's share of
disabling negligence from 50% to 51% hardly represents a major
change in philosophy. But it may have a greater practical impact
39. Under the Louisiana special verdict procedure, the jury, if there is one, deter-
mines the allocation of negligence, with the judge doing actual computation of the
reduction. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 2, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1811.
40. When both parties suffer loss, there will be a problem of set-off. See text at
notes 62-68, infra.
41. WIs. STAT. § 242 (1931).
42. For a list of the states adopting the original Wisconsin form of modified com-
parative negligence, see H. WOODS, supra note 17, at 82-83.
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977).
44. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1979).
45. E.g., Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1974); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1978); Oregon, OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 18.470 to .490 (1975).
46. Using the highest percentages at which plaintiffs can recover, rather than the
lowest at which they can be barred from recovery, Professor Fleming has referred to
the two modified comparative negligence approaches as the "49 percent rule" and the
"50 percent rule." Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legisla-
ture on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Associa-
tion v. Superior Court, 30 HAST. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (1979).
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than theory would suggest, if, as they are likely to do, juries in close
cases divide the negligence down the middle.
Both forms of modified comparative negligence operate like pure
comparative negligence up to the cutoff percentage. Thus, the plain-
tiff who suffered $10,000 in damages and to whom 30% of the negli-
gence is attributable could recover $7,000, the same amount as that
recovered under pure comparative negligence. But, unlike pure com-
parative negligence, there is a limit upon the plaintiff's right to
recover short of the point at which 100% of the negligence is at-
tributable to him. If both parties suffer loss, under the "50 percent
bar" only the party less negligent can recover. If the negligence is
divided equally between them, neither can recover. Under the "51
percent bar," each can recover up to the point that the negligence is
divided evenly between them.
Multi-Defendant Cases
a) Under Pure Comparative Negligence
When there is more than one defendant, the problem of calculat-
ing the percentage of negligence attributable to each party may be
more difficult for the jury, but once these shares are determined the
mathematics of reducing the plaintiff's recovery is no more difficult
than it is in the basic two-party case. Thus, if the plaintiff with
$10,000 in damages is responsible for 30% of the negligence, and one
defendant responsible for 30% and another for 40%, the plaintiff is
entitled to $7,000, the same recovery as in the basic two-party case.
And the same mechanics for reduction of damages are used when
more than two parties suffer loss-the recovery of each party is
reduced by the share of the total negligence attributable to him.
Beyond whatever practical difficulties there are in measuring
the plaintiff's share of the negligence in multi-defendant cases, there
is the more significant problem of whether that share is to be calcu-
lated with or without reference to the negligence of persons not
before the court. The problem of what effect should be given to the
negligence of an absent person is discussed in some detail in the
later sections of this article dealing with joint and several liability
and contribution. 7 For the reasons explained there, the preferable
rule is one which does not take into account the negligence of those
not parties to the action. This divides the burden of pursuing absent
persons and the risk of their insolvency between the plaintiff and
the defendants, a result that seems most consistent with the basic
concept of comparative negligence. However, pure comparative
47. See text at notes 77-101, infra.
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negligence statutes,48 including that of Louisiana,49 are uniform in us-
ing the negligence of all persons whose negligence has caused the
plaintiff's harm in determining the share of the negligence attribut-
able to the plaintiff.
b) Under Modified Comparative Negligence
Modified comparative negligence plans present the same policy
problems as do pure systems with respect to the issue of whether
the share of the plaintiff's negligence is to be determined with or
without reference to the negligence of absent persons. Some modi-
fied comparative negligence statutes operate in the same way as do
the pure and include the negligence of all persons whose negligence
contributed to the plaintiff's harm, whether or not all are before the
court."0 Other statutes expressly provide that the plaintiff's share is
to be calculated only with reference "to the total negligence of all
persons against whom recovery is sought."'" The differences be-
tween modified comparative negligence and pure do not suggest
that the two systems should differ with respect to this issue. As
already stated," ignoring the negligence of absent persons is the
preferable rule.
A problem that is unique to modified comparative negligence is
whether a plaintiff can, in any event, recover against a defendant
less negligent than he. The pure comparative negligence concept is
built upon the acceptability of a plaintiff being able to recover from
a defendant much less negligent than the plaintiff. But implicit in
modified comparative negligence is the notion that at some point the
plaintiff's share of the negligence, when compared to that of others
whose negligence contributed to his harm, becomes large enough so
that the plaintiff cannot recover at all. When there is only one
defendant, that cutoff point is reached when, depending upon the
form used, the plaintiff's share of the negligence reaches 50% or
51%. But if there is more than one defendant, the plaintiff's share of
the negligence may equal or exceed that of one or more of the defen-
dants, but still not reach 50% or more of the total. What should be
the result, for example, if the plaintiff's share of the total negligence
48. See note 37, supra.
49. Act 431 makes it clear that the negligence of absent persons counts-a series
of questions relating to the negligence of absent persons must be put to the jury. 1979
La. Acts, No. 431, § 2, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1811. -'
50. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (1971);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 507:7a (1977).
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1973). See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31
(1975); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.470 to .490 (1975).
52. See text at note 48, supra.
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is 40% and the share of each of two defendants is 30%? Focusing
upon the mechanics of reducing the plaintiff's recovery discussed
above, he should be able to recover 60% of his damages-but from
whom? Some legislatures have concluded that permitting a plaintiff
to recover from a less negligent defendant would conflict with the
rationale of modified comparative negligence. The New Hampshire
statute, for example, precludes recovery by a plaintiff in such cir-
cumstances."
The Massachusetts statute, on the other hand, permits recovery
when the negligence of the plaintiff does not exceed that of all per-
sons against whom he seeks recovery. 4 Thus, in the preceding hypo-
thetical in which the plaintiff is allocated 40% of the negligence and
the two defendants are allocated 30% each, the plaintiff could
recover damages from both, even though his negligence exceeded
that of each. But he could recover only by joining both; if he is able
to sue only one of them, his negligence would exceed that of "all
persons against whom recovery is sought." This result puts pressure
upon plaintiffs under such a statute to bring suit in a forum in which
all defendants can be sued and to sue defendants who are clearly
judgment proof or even who are immune from liability." Interesting-
ly, none of the modified comparative negligence statutes permits
recovery when the negligence of the plaintiff exceeds that of all
other persons before the court, but is less than the total of all per-
sons causing harm.
Once modified comparative negligence is accepted as preferable
to the pure form, policy does not clearly preponderate in favor of
53. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 507:7a (1977). Other statutes operating in the same way
are those of Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (1975); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (1971); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 18.470 to .490 (1975).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (1973). Other statutes operating in the same
way are those of Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (1973); and Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1977).
55. Under statutes such as that of Massachusetts, which prohibit the plaintiff
from recovering at all when his negligence exceeds that of "all persons against whom
recovery is sought," an interesting dilemma is posed when one of the persons whose
negligence has contributed to the plaintiffs harm is immune from liability to the plain-
tiff. According to these statutes, it is the negligence of the persons "against whom
recovery is sought" that counts, not that as to whom recovery is allowed. Thus, if the
negligence of an immune person is needed to make the negligence of all persons from
whom the plaintiff seeks recovery exceed that of the plaintiff, the plaintiff will have to
bring suit against the immune person even if there is no hope of recovery. Would such
a suit violate Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which prohibits "knowingly [advancing] a claim . .. that is unwarranted under existing
law," or subject the plaintiff to an action by the immune defendant for malicious pros-
ecution?
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either the New Hampshire or Massachusetts approach. New Hamp-
shire has obviously adopted its view of the "sandlot" equities be-
tween the plaintiff and each individual defendant.56 On the other
hand, when the focus is more generally on the impact upon the
plaintiff who is less than 50% negligent, observers are apt to ap-
prove the Massachusetts approach of permitting recovery so long as
the plaintiff's share of the negligence is less than the cutoff point of
nonrecovery .,
When a negligent defendant is not liable to the plaintiff because
his negligence is less than that of the plaintiff, there is the addi-
tional problem of determining who should absorb the loss repre-
sented by that defendant's share. For example, assume that the
plaintiff's share of the negligence is 20%, that of D, 10/o, of D2 30/o,
and of D, 40/o. Under the New Hampshire statute, D 1, because the
plaintiff's negligence exceeds his, is not liable. However, the loss at-
tributable to his share of the negligence must be borne by someone.
It could be allocated in any of three ways: entirely to D, and D3, en-
tirely to the plaintiff, or divided among all of them. There is cer-
tainly no reason to require D2 and D3 to entirely absorb the loss;
such a result is inconsistent with the comparative negligence princi-
ple that the share of negligence determines the share of loss.58 For
the same reason, the loss probably ought not to be assessed entirely
against the plaintiff, although the argument in logic for the plaintiff
is not quite so strong as it is .for the defendants. Modified compara-
tive negligence carries with it a limitation upon the principle that
liability is proportioned to negligence; the plaintiff whose negligence
equals or exceeds (depending upon the statute) that of all others
whose negligence caused his harm cannot recover at all. A further
limitation upon the comparative negligence principle appears in
those statutes, like New Hampshire's, that bar a plaintiff from
recovering from a less negligent defendant. Thus, while modified
comparative negligence embodies the principle that the defendant's
56. See Nixon, supra note 20, at 24-25 & 32-34.
57. See, e.g., May v. Skelly Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 264 N.W.2d 574 (1978). In May,
the court, in dictum, observed:
The majority of this court has become convinced that comparing the negli-
gence of the individual plaintiff to that of each individual tortfeasor- rather than
comparing the negligence of the individual plaintiff to that of the combined negli-
gence of the several tortfeasors who have collectively contributed to plaintiffs in-
juries-leads to harsh and unfair results; the majority has further concluded that
this rule of comparative negligence, a court made doctrine, can be changed by
court decision.
Id. at 38, 264 N.W.2d at 578.
58. This policy is further elaborated in connection with the problem of joint and
several liability. See subsection entitled "Liability to the Plaintiff-Joint and Several
Liability," infra.
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liability should be proportioned to his negligence, it does not adhere
fully to that principle when it comes to measuring the impact of the
plaintiff's negligence. Thus, the plaintiff's claim not to bear the en-
tire share of the loss attributable to a less negligent defendant is
weaker than that of the remaining defendants. But probably the
fairest solution is to divide that share of the loss among all remain-
ing parties, plaintiff and defendants, according to their shares of the
negligence.59 Oddly enough, by a statute that is otherwise heavily
defendant oriented,"° the New Hampshire statute imposes the full
loss upon the defendants, and none of it upon the plaintiff."' This is
added to the benefit afforded to the plaintiff under that statute from
measuring the amount of the reduction in his damages by reference
to all persons, including those not before the court, whose negli-
gence caused his harm. Thus, in New Hampshire, defendants, who
are ultimately charged with liability, are liable not only for the
share of the harm caused by any defendant less negligent than the
plaintiff, but for the shares attributable to absent defendants as
well.
The Problem of Set-off
If both the plaintiff and the defendant have suffered harm and
are entitled to recover, the problem of whether to require set-off
arises." Assume a case in which the jury has allocated 50% of the
total negligence to A and 50% to B, in an accident causing $2,000 of
damages to A and $1,000 to B. Should the amount of the judgment
to which A is entitled be computed by reducing his damages by 50%
and subtracting the amount that B would otherwise be entitled to
recover, to reach a net judgment of $500? Applying the normal rules
of set-off, this would be the result. However, if both A and B are
covered by liability insurance, setting off judgments in this fashion
would benefit the insurance companies at the expense of their in-
sureds. Thus, of the $1,000 to which A would otherwise be entitled
to compensate him for his loss, he would receive only $500. And B's
59. This method of dividing the loss is consistent with what this writer believes to
be generally the fairest way to handle the loss attributable to the negligence of per-
sons who for one reason or another are not liable.
60. The New Hampshire statute embodies modified, not pure, comparative negli-
gence and has abrogated joint and several liability as to persons before the court. N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977).
61. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977).
62. Under modified comparative negligence, set-off problems could only arise (1)
when the negligence is divided evenly among the parties and the law permits recovery
in such cases, and (2) when the negligence of at least two parties is less than 50% each
and the law permits them to recover against persons less negligent. Under pure com-
parative negligence, set-off problems arise no matter how the negligence is divided.
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insurer would get the total benefit of B's verdict against A. There is
no public policy that suggests that insurers should benefit in this
way from comparative negligence laws.
One way to avoid this result would be to prohibit set-off in com-
parative negligence actions, as was done in the Rhode Island" and
Oregon" statutes. But this broad prohibition goes further than
necessary, since it would apply in cases in which neither party has
insurance and would work unfairness in cases in which one party is
insolvent. Thus, in the above hypothetical if neither A nor B were
insured and A were insolvent, B would have to pay A $1,000, but
B would have to get in line with A's other creditors to recover his
$500.5
Both of these effects can be avoided by requiring set-off except
to the extent that an insurer would benefit from it, 6 or by requiring
set-off in all cases but establishing a procedure whereby an insurer
must reimburse its own insured in such a way as to prevent the in-
surer from benefiting from the set-off. In the absence of specific
resolutions of the problem, some courts have applied set-off statutes
when they are mandatory. 7 Other courts, however, have been will-
ing to ignore set-off statutes, at least when comparative negligence
was judicially adopted. 8
Calculating the Plaintiff's Share of the Negligence
in "Derivative" Actions
Under the Louisiana comparative negligence statute, the person
whose negligence is counted for the purpose of reducing recovery is
the person "suffering the injury, death or loss."" In the discussion
thus far in this article, it has been tacitly assumed that that person
63. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1 (1979).
64. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.490 (1978).
65. Although the Uniform Comparative Fault Act prohibits set-off, it supplies a
procedure whereby the hypothetical result indicated in the text can be avoided. Sec-
tion 3 of the Act provides:
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each other, except by
agreement of both parties. On motion, however, the court, if it finds that the
obligation of either party is likely to be uncollectible, may order that both parties
make payment into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the funds
received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment into court by either
party had been a payment to the other party and any distribution of those funds
back to the party making payment had been a payment to him by the other party.
66. This is the suggestion of Professor James, supra note 15, at 222.
67. Jess v. Hermann, 79 Cal. App. 3d 140, 144 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1978); Johnson v.
Richardson, 234 Miss. 849, 108 So. 2d 194 (1959); Willingham v. Hagerty, 553 S.W.2d
137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
68. See Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 343 P.2d 977 (1959).
69. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, § 1, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323.
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
and the plaintiff are identical. This need not be true. There are in-
stances in which the plaintiff's action is "derivative" in that he is
not suing for direct physical harm to himself but rather because of
such harm to some other person. Actions for wrongful death and
loss of consortium'" are derivative in this sense. Where the plaintiff's
own negligence has caused harm to the other person, he would be
barred from recovery under a contributory negligence system,7' and
his recovery should be reduced proportionately under comparative
negligence. But should the negligence of that other person be taken
into account to reduce the plaintiff's recovery? Under the pre-com-
parative negligence law in Louisiana"2 and generally elsewhere, 73 the
negligence of a decedent did bar an action by the non-negligent
wrongful death beneficiaries. Read literally, the comparative negli-
gence statute would appear to change this, since the negligence of
the decedent is not that of the plaintiff. But the derivative nature of
wrongful death actions was confirmed in Callais v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co.,74 and a clearer expression of intent to alter this view than
that presently in the Louisiana statute is likely to be required.
Loss Apportionment Among Defendants
Comparative negligence laws developed in response to the felt
injustice of the all-or-nothing effect of contributory negligence."5 But
70. Louisiana does not recognize actions for loss of consortium. See Kelly v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 353 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed,
357 So. 2d 1141 (La. 1978).
The rule in most states is that the action for loss of consortium is a derivative ac-
tion and thus, the contributory negligence of the physically injured spouse bars action
by the other spouse. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 892-93. Prosser criticizes the
rule, however, and argues that the action for loss of consortium is independent and
that recovery should not depend on whether the physically injured spouse was not
negligent. In New Hampshire, the action is viewed as independent, see Reid v.
Spadone Mach. Co., 400 A.2d 54 (N.H. 1979), and thus presumably the injured spouse's
negligence would not serve to reduce the plaintiffs recovery. The Washington com-
parative negligence statute specifically provides that the negligence of the spouse who
is the primary victim shall not be imputed to the other spouse in an action by the lat-
ter for the death of, or injury to, the former. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010
(1979).
71. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 913.
72. See Ritter v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 321 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 325 So. 2d 586 (La. 1976).
73. See, e.g., Colorado & S.R. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 517, 81 P. 801 (1905); Clark
v. Foster, 87 Idaho 134, 391 P.2d 853 (1964); Callais v. Allstate Ins. Co., 334 So. 2d 692
(La. 1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 910-11.
74. 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1976).
75. The attack upon contributory negligence has been founded upon the obvious
injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on
one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and
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when the plaintiff's harm has been caused by the negligence of two
or more other persons, the principle of comparative negligence that
loss should be apportioned by shares of negligence has an obvious
applicability to the apportionment of the plaintiff's recovery among
those persons. The traditional doctrines of loss apportionment
among defendants that could be affected by comparative negligence
laws are those of joint and several liability and of contribution
among joint tortfeasors. The first of these doctrines determines how
the recovery is to be apportioned among the defendants vis-a-vis
the plaintiff, and the second determines the apportionment among
the defendants vis-g-vis each other. Comparative negligence also
has implications for the effect that ought to be given to
settlements."6
Liability to the Plaintiff-Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability is the ordinary rule of liability when
two or more persons negligently act either in concert or in-
dependently to cause indivisible harm.77 In a system under which the
defendant pays for the harm his negligence causes, except to a plain-
tiff whose own negligence has contributed to the harm, this rule is a
logical one. As indicated in the discussion relating to the problem of
what is to be compared under comparative negligence, negligence or
causation, causation is an either/or proposition."8 There are no
degrees of causation. Thus, under the negligence/contributory
negligence system, there is no logical basis upon which to apportion
the liability to the plaintiff among the several defendants-if they
all caused the harm, they each ought to be liable to the plaintiff for
the whole of it.
But the principle of comparative negligence does provide a basis
for apportioning the plaintiff's recovery among defendants, and the
rules of joint and several liability ought to be rethought in light of
that principle. In the following analysis of how comparative negli-
gence ought to affect joint and several liability, a distinction is made
between cases in which the plaintiff is free of negligence and those
in which he is not.
quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot free. No one
ever has succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will.
Prosser, supra note 10, at 469.
76. The problems referred to are dealt with in more detail, and with more of a
Louisiana outlook, elsewhere in this symposium. See Chamallas, Comparative Fault
and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 LA. L.
REv. 373 (1980). Thus the present treatment of these topics is sketchy and is designed
simply to make a few points which are interrelated with the preceding analysis.
77. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 297 & 314-17.
78. See note 12, supra, and accompanying text.
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When the plaintiff himself has been negligent, the logical sup-
port for joint and several liability evaporates. That is, the law, by
recognizing that loss which is jointly caused by the negligence of the
plaintiff and the defendants can, and should be, apportioned accord-
ing to the shares of negligence, provides a logical basis for appor-
tioning the plaintiff's recovery among the defendants. Comparative
negligence does not make the plaintiff's negligence irrelevant to
recovery; rather, the defendants do not have to pay the plaintiff for
that portion of the latter's loss attributable to his own negligence.
The principle of loss apportionment by shares of negligence that in-
sulates a defendant from liability to the plaintiff for loss due to
plaintiff's negligence also should serve to insulate a defendant from
liability for loss to the plaintiff attributable to the negligence of
another defendant. There is nothing in logic that suggests that the
negligence of the plaintiff and the negligence of other defendants
ought to be treated differently in this respect.
If all those whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff's harm
are before the court and solvent, abrogation of joint and several
liability would cause no hardship to plaintiffs, beyond preventing
them from determining, for purely personal reasons, who as an in-
itial matter must satisfy the recovery. Certainly, relieving the plain-
tiff of the burden of pursuing all defendants until his judgment is
satisfied would not seem to be a valid reason for transferring the
burden of pursuit to one or more defendants.
But if one or more of the persons whose negligence caused the
plaintiff's harm is not before the court"9 or is insolvent, the decision
of whether or not to abrogate joint and several liability can have an
important impact upon the parties. For the reasons set out above,
joint and several liability is inconsistent with the loss apportionment
idea inherent in comparative negligence, and for that reason, it
should not be retained."0 If joint and several liability is abolished,
there are two alternatives as to how the loss of the non-paying per-
son can be allocated; it can be allocated entirely to the plaintiff, or it
79. A potential defendant is likely to be absent only if he is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. If the plaintiff prefers, for some reason, not to bring suit
against an otherwise suable person, the named defendants are likely to bring such a
person in and have him joined as a defendant. Joinder can be compelled in such cases
in Louisiana, see State Dep't of Hwys. v. Lamar Adv. Co. of La., Inc., 279 So. 2d 671
(La. 1973), but not in all states. See, e.g., Mihoy v. Proulx, 113 N.H. 698, 313 A.2d 723
(1973).
80. A rather unpersuasive argument for retaining joint and several liability is
made in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978). The court, in its single-minded concern for compensating
the injured plaintiff, simply did not indicate why it is fairer for a defendant to suffer
loss out of proportion to his negligence than it is for the negligent plaintiff to do so.
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can be apportioned among all those whose negligence caused the
harm, plaintiff and remaining defendants, according to the ratio that
their respective shares of the negligence bear to each other.
On one view, the most logical rule is the allocation of the non-
paying person's share to the negligent plaintiff. Comparative
negligence is premised not only upon the ability but upon the desir-
ability of apportioning loss according to the shares of negligence at-
tributable to the parties.8" At a minimum this means: (1) a person
causing loss to himself by his own negligence cannot recover that
portion of his loss that equals his share of the negligence; and (2) a
person causing loss to another by his negligence is liable according
to his share of the negligence. These principles suggest a third: a
person's share of the negligence should not only determine the ex-
tent of his liability, but the limit as well. As previously observed, a
defendant is not liable to the negligent plaintiff for the loss allocated
to the plaintiff, and this is true whether or not the plaintiff can,
without major economic dislocation, bear the loss himself. There is
no logical reason why the rule should be different when the plaintiff
urges that one defendant should pay for the unsatisfiable share of
another defendant.82
This result is consistent with the general legal attitude toward
plaintiffs who are faced with an absent or insolvent defendant; the
law does not guarantee to every plaintiff a defendant who has
neither of these characteristics. 3 Perhaps the closest analogy to allo-
cation by shares of negligence is allocation by causation. If two per-
sons act independently to cause discrete and divisible increments of
harm to the plaintiff, neither person is liable for the unsatisfied loss
caused by the other;84 liability is several, not joint. And if a person
is not liable for harm caused by another, neither should he be liable
for harm attributable to the other based upon the division of the
negligence.
81. Although modified comparative negligence systems do not embody this princi-
ple fully, the present discussion applies as much to such systems as it does to pure
comparative negligence.
82. This argument carries, of course, implications for contribution among tort-
feasors. See text at notes 99-101, infra.
83. This does not mean that the law is indifferent to problems caused by absent
or insolvent persons. "Long arm" statutes and compulsory automobile liability insur-
ance, for example, are designed to smooth the plaintiffs way to recovery. But even
these, of course, do not furnish complete protection against loss attributable to absent
and insolvent persons.
84. This is also true when the other person is the plaintiff himself. If the plaintiff
causes harm to himself, by failing unreasonably to "mitigate" his damages, he, and not
the defendant, must absorb the loss attributable to such failure. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 12, at 422-24. See also the discussion in note 12, supra, with respect to the
"seat belt" cases.
1980]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
On the other hand, there does seem to be something unfair-
something inconsistent with our "sandlot instincts," to use the New
Hampshire terminology 8 - with imposing all of the loss attributable
to the non-responsible person upon the negligent plaintiff. There are
those, for example, who reject the foregoing analogy to liability
based upon causation." In any event, rejecting the rule which would
impose the loss entirely upon the defendant would not mean accep-
tance of joint and several liability. A compromise approach in which
the parties divide the uncollectible loss among themselves according
to the ratio that their shares of negligence bear to each other is
possible. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act achieves the splitting
of such loss by: (1) ignoring the negligence of parties not before the
court;87 (2) retaining joint and several liability as to persons before
the court;88 (3) providing for contribution among tortfeasors propor-
tioned to their negligence;" and (4) calling for redistribution, a year
after the initial judgment, among the remaining parties, including
the plaintiff, of any loss then uncollectible" While this approach
does achieve the goal of dividing uncollectible losses among the par-
ties to the action, it imposes upon a defendant who has paid more
than his share of the loss to the plaintiff both the initial burden of
pursuing the non-paying party and the risk that, in the event of a
redistribution proceeding, the plaintiff will be insolvent and unable
to compensate the defendant for his share of the redistributed loss.
As already observed, there is no policy reason for transferring from
the plaintiff to one of the defendants the burden of securing satisfac-
tion of a judgment from the other defendants." Nor should the
defendant be required to underwrite the risk that the plaintiff will
be unable to meet his share of the redistributed loss. Of course,
were the plaintiff to have to wait a year before recovering what
turns out to be an otherwise uncollectible loss from a defendant,
there is some risk that such defendant would be unable to pay to
the plaintiff his share of the redistributed loss. But this risk is less
than that of the plaintiff's inability to pay. In most cases, the defen-
dant who would be called upon to pay more than his share is likely
to have liability insurance, a source which would be available to the
85. Nixon, supra note 20.
86. See Berg, Comparative Contribution and Its Alternatives: The Equitable Dis-
tribution of Accident Losses, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 577, 587 (1976).
87. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(a)(2). The Act also calls for the inclusion
of the share of the negligence of any person who has settled with the plaintiff and has
been released from liability under section 6 of the Act.
88. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(c).
89. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 4.
90. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(d).
91. See text at notes 78-80, supra.
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plaintiff at any time. The negligent plaintiff's redistribution liability,
on the other hand, will not be backed by insurance. Thus, the fairer
system for dividing uncollectible losses would be to adopt the Uni-
form Act approach, but to abrogate, rather than to retain, joint and
several liability as to those before the court. This would put the
burden upon the plaintiff of pursuing all defendants for the purpose
of satisfying the judgment and would avoid the very real risk to the
overpaying defendant that the plaintiff will be unable to reimburse
him for the plaintiff's redistributed share of the uncollectible loss.92
While the commentators favor a rule which divides the uncol-
lectible loss between the negligent plaintiff and the remaining defen-
dants,93 thus far no American jurisdiction has adopted the approach
of the Uniform Act of redistributing the uncollectible loss. However,
this does not mean that joint and several liability has been fully re-
tained in all states. While some states have retained it, others have
totally or partially abrogated it.94
The preceding discussion of joint and several liability was pre-
mised upon the situation in which the plaintiff himself was negligent.
92. This method would require a plaintiff in such cases to wait up to a year to ful-
ly recover what he is entitled to recover, and perhaps plaintiffs as a class can less af-
ford to wait for recovery than can defendants, or their insurers, as a class. That this is
a valid reason for making defendants rather than plaintiffs initially absorb loss out of
proportion to their negligence is doubtful. It is even less persuasive as a reason when
the risk of the plaintiffs inability to pay is added to the defendant's burden, or to that
of his insurer.
93. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 46, at 1491-94.
94. Under comparative negligence, joint and several liability is fully retaided by
calculating the shares of negligence with reference to all persons, including those not
before the court, whose negligence caused the plaintiffs harm and imposing upon each
defendant liability for the full amount that the plaintiff is entitled to recover-limiting
the plaintiff to one full recovery, of course. This is the law of California, see American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899
(1978); Idaho, see IDAHO CODE §§ 6-803 to -804 (1971); and Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-27-37 & -41 (1973). Joint and several liability is fully abrogated by calculating the
shares of negligence in the same way, but by imposing upon each defendant liability
only for his share of the plaintiff's recovery. Statutes embodying this approach are
those of Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a)(d) (1976); and Nevada, see NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.141(3)(a) & (b) (1973).
Joint and several liability is partially abrogated either by calculating the share of
negligence with reference only to those before the court or by making each defendant
liable only for his share, regardless of whether or not the negligence of non-parties is
used to determine the shares of negligence. States partially abrogating joint and
several liability are Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (1973);
New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1977); and North Dakota, see N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-10-07 (1973).
The Louisiana statute retains joint and several liability except that "a judgment
debtor shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor
to whom a greater degree of negligence has been attributed .... 1979 La. Acts, No.
431, § 1, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.
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Although rigorous application of the loss apportionment principle of
comparative negligence might suggest that the non-negligent plain-
tiff be treated the same as the negligent plaintiff, on balance this
writer concludes that joint and several liability should be fully re-
tained when the plaintiff is not negligent. To abrogate joint and
several liability in the case of the non-negligent plaintiff would be to
make such persons worse off under comparative negligence than
they were under contributory negligence. And it seems incongruous
to take the benefits given by comparative negligence to negligent
plaintiffs out of the hides, so to speak, of non-negligent plaintiffs.
Furthermore, to speak of the abrogation or retention of joint and
several liability with respect to the negligent plaintiff as a technical
matter makes no sense; that doctrine had no applicability to the
negligent plaintiff under contributory negligence because he had no
recovery.
But treating negligent and non-negligent plaintiffs differently
with respect to joint and several liability also creates incongruities.
Is there that much difference, for example, between a totally non-
negligent plaintiff and one who is only 1% negligent? And even with
the non-negligent plaintiff, is it fair to impose the full liability for
the plaintiff's recovery upon a defendant who is only 1% negligent
when the defendant who is 99% negligent is insolvent? These ques-
tions suggest that both logical consistency and fairness probably are
not obtainable. What is called for, then, is a compromise that makes
the least inroads into both values. That compromise is one under
which joint and several liability applies when the plaintiff is not
negligent, but does not apply when the plaintiff is negligent. Cases
in which the plaintiff is 1% negligent will be rarer than those in
which the plaintiff is free of negligence. Shares of negligence are not
calculated by computers but by people whose ability to discern small
increments of negligence is obviously limited. Thus, as a practical
matter, whatever incongruity there is in theory in treating the non-
negligent plaintiff differently than the very slightly negligent plain-
tiff is fairly insignificant. There are also likely to be very few cases
in which the negligence of the defendants is divided 99 to 1. Thus,
the greatest fidelity to the ideals of loss apportionment of com-
parative negligence and the protection of the negligent-free plaintiff
is achieved by adhering to joint and several liability for the non-
negligent plaintiff, but not for the negligent plaintiff. 5
95. At least one court has ruled that the comparative negligence statute does not
apply at all when the plaintiff is not guilty of negligence. See Kampman v. Dunham,
560 P.2d 91 (Colo. 1977). While this is consistent with a literal reading of most com-
parative negligence statutes, other courts faced with the issue have held otherwise.
See Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978); Mihoy v. Proulx, 113 N.H. 698,
313 A.2d 723 (1973).
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A special problem with respect to who should bear the loss at-
tributable to the negligence of non-responsible persons arises when
the non-responsibility results from immunity. Under the negligence/
contributory negligence system, if the negligence of two persons,
one of whom is immune to liability, combines to cause indivisible
harm to the plaintiff, the non-immune person is liable in full for the
plaintiff's damages. 6 This is not, of course, an instance of joint and
several liability, since the immune person is not liable to the plain-
tiff at all. But liability would seem to be supported by the underly-
ing theory of joint and several liability that each person should be
fully liable for the harm he negligently causes, even if some other
person has also acted to cause the harm.
The problem is one of how that portion of the plaintiff's loss at-
tributable to the immune person should be distributed among the re-
maining parties. The answer to this question should depend upon
the nature of the immunity. If the immunity is total-that is, if it
extends to all other persons involved in the case, such as govern-
mental immunity-then it would seem appropriate to treat such an
immune person as if he were insolvent. Thus, if the plaintiff were
negligent, the immune person's share of the loss should be dis-
tributed among the remaining parties, including the plaintiff. This
would be achieved by ignoring the immune person's negligence in
calculating the total pool of negligence to be divided among the
others. If the plaintiff were not negligent, then the immune person's
share of the loss should be imposed upon the remaining defendants.
But if the immunity extends only to the plaintiff, and not to the
others involved, as in cases of the family and the workers' compen-
sation immunities, then it would be inappropriate to impose any of
the loss attributable to such immune person upon any person other
than the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff is guilty of no negligence.
These immunities result not from a broad judgment that the im-
mune person should not be liable at all for certain kinds of negli-
gence, as is the case of governmental immunity, but rather on the
narrower ground that because of some special relationship, this
plaintiff should not recover from this defendant. There is no reason
under comparative negligence to permit the plaintiff to avoid the
consequences of that relationship by shifting all or part of the loss
to non-immune persons. This result could be accomplished by in-
cluding the negligence of the immune persons in the determination
96. See Shonka v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1178, 152 N.W.2d 242 (1967); Rodgers v.
Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair
Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
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of the shares of negligence of the others, but then limiting the
liability of the other defendants to their shares of the negligence.97
Liability to Each Other- Contribution"
Whether there should be contribution among tortfeasors, and, if
so, how it should work, become issues under comparative fault if
97. This was the approach used by the court in Miles v. West, 224 Kan. 284, 580
P.2d 876 (1978). While that case involved family immunities, the court wrote as if the
plaintiff would absorb the full loss attributed to a person with total immunity. Such a
result is consistent with the court's statement that the full loss attributable to an insol-
vent tortfeasor is also allocated to the plaintiff. Holding that the defendant, rather
than the plaintiff, must absorb the loss attributable to a negligent person who is im-
mune to liability to the plaintiff (here the plaintiff's father) is Dixon v. Royal Cab, Inc.,
396 A.2d 930 (R.I. 1979). The court in Dixon seemed to view the issue as one of im-
puted negligence and relied on an earlier Rhode Island case in which the court refused
to impute the negligence of the plaintiff's mother to the plaintiff. This obviously
misconceives the issue; it is not whether the negligence of the immune person should
be imputed to the plaintiff. If one does view the issue that way, then the Rhode Island
court in Dixon imputed the plaintiff's father's negligence to the defendant. The issue is
rather how the loss attributable to the negligence of an immune person is to be allo-
cated among the remaining parties.
Problems caused by family immunities are even more complicated than the text
would suggest. Some states have abrogated the immunities as such, but prohibit some
suits when the act of negligence arises from conduct peculiar in some sense to the
family relationship. Thus, the husband-wife tort immunity has been abrogated except
as to conduct "involving marital or nuptial privileges, consensual acts and simple, com-
mon domestic negligence." Tevis v. Tevis, 400 A.2d 1189, 1192 (N.J. 1979). And the
parent-child immunity has been abrogated except as to failure to supervise. See
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974). If, under these rules, one
family member cannot sue another, it might be said that there is no negligence with
respect to the plaintiff which could be included in the total pool of negligence. And yet
the same conduct which causes harm to the family member might also cause harm to
one to whom the immunity does not extend, and the torts process stands ready to con-
demn that conduct as negligent. It would therefore seem appropriate in family immun-
ity cases to assess the negligence of immune persons for the purpose of protecting the
non-immune person, even though in theory the immune person did not act negligently
toward the plaintiff.
98. A plaintiff's losses are allocated among several persons not only by way of
contribution, but also by way of indemnity. The latter differs from the former in that
it is not a method of apportioning loss, but is rather a method of imposing the full loss
on one person. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 310. Apart from contract, a defen-
dant may be entitled to indemnity from another because of qualitative differences in
their negligent conduct. Thus, in some states a defendant whose negligence is
"passive" may recover in full from another person whose negligence in causing the
plaintiff's harm is "active." See, e.g., Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242
(1964); Western Cas. & Surety Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 413 S.W.2d 550 (Mo. App. 1967). In
such cases, it would seem appropriate to permit contribution proportioned to
negligence. The all-or-nothing aspect of indemnity under such circumstances is
analogous to last clear chance, which most observers feel has no place in comparative
negligence schemes. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 13, at 259-60.
However, if the right to indemnity arises out of a relationship between the parties
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joint and several liability is totally or partially retained.99 Consis-
tency with the concept of comparative negligence requires that con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors in such cases be permitted, and
that such contribution be based upon the parties' shares of negli-
gence. The commentators are uniform in their approval of propor-
tionate contribution,' ° and no other approach makes sense under
comparative negligence.
If the analysis in the preceding section relating to immune per-
sons is accepted, there is little reason to follow those courts which
now permit, at least sometimes,' contribution against a person who
is immune from liability that extends only to the plaintiff. Under the
negligence/contributory negligence system, there is no method of
allocating to the plaintiff the loss attributable to the immune person,
and as between an immune person and a non-immune person, no-
tions of fairness might support dividing the loss between them
rather than imposing it all upon the hapless non-immune person. But
under comparative negligence, the plaintiff becomes a possible can-
didate for absorbing the loss attributable to a person who is immune
to liability to him. And for the reasons expressed in the preceding
section, that is where the loss should be imposed. There is no reason
for a back door abrogation of the immunity by permitting contribu-
tion against the immune person.
The Effect of Settlement
Comparative negligence laws also present unique problems with
respect to settlement. Under the negligence/contributory negligence
system, a settlement by the plaintiff with one of several tortfeasors
has two effects. As to the plaintiff, it reduces the liability of the
other defendants by the dollar amount of the settlement. As to the
settling defendant, a settlement made in good faith insulates that
irrespective of fault, then comparative negligence laws should have no effect. Such
rights of indemnity occur, for example when a master responds initially in damages for
harm caused by a servant, see, e.g., Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d
626 (1966); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 497 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1973), and
when a retailer responds initially in damages for a defectively manufactured product,
see, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Farr v. Arm-
strong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d (1970).
99. The mechanics by which joint and several liability can be retained totally or
partially are set out in note 94, supra.
100. See Berg, supra note 86; Fleming, supra'note 13, at 251; Griffith, Helmsley &
Burr, Contribution, Indemnity, Settlements & Releases, What the Pennsylvania Com-
parative Negligence Statute Did Not Say, 24 VILL. L.R. 494, 496 (1979).
101. New York permits contribution in the case of workers' compensation, see Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972), but not in cases of parent-
child immunity, see Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974).
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defendant from further liability to the plaintiff and, by way of con-
tribution, to the other defendants. 2 Comparative negligence does
not suggest that the latter effect should in any way be changed. The
settling defendant should continue to be insulated from further lia-
bility to the plaintiff and, if there is good faith, to the other defen-
dants. But there remains an important problem of the extent to
which the plaintiff's rights against the other defendants should be
affected.
Under the negligence/contributory negligence system, each
defendant declared liable is, under the rules of joint and several
liability, liable for the whole of the plaintiff's harm. Under the early
laws of contribution, the plaintiff could not bar any person's right to
contribution by settling with another person also liable to the plain-
tiff for less than the settling person's per capita share of the ulti-
mate judgment."3 While this seemed fair to the non-settling persons,
it robbed all those who might be liable to the plaintiff of any incen-
tive to settle individually. A compromise between the perceived
need to encourage and protect settlements and fairness to the non-
settling persons was reached by barring the non-settling person
from contribution from one who did settle only if the settlement
were made in good faith. 4 While this rule would protect the non-
settling persons from the most obvious cases of overreaching, it
would leave them helpless in many cases because of the difficulties
involved in proving bad faith."5 Thus, they would end up paying
substantial amounts in excess of their per capita share."6
Under a comparative negligence system, however, these prob-
102. Hangar Cab Co. v. City of Atlanta, 122 Ga. App. 661, 178 S.E.2d 292 (1970);
Rio Grande Gas Co. v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969).
103. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 309.
104. See Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Hobbs v. Hurley, 117
Me. 449, 104 A. 814 (1918); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 190, 33 N.W. 320 (1887);
Annot., Contribution Between Negligent Tortfeasors at Common Law, 60 A.L.R.2d
1366 (1958).
105. Openshaw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 192, 484 P.2d 1032 (1971); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967); Manchester Ins. &
Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. App. 1976).
106. To some extent, the effect of overpayment by non-settlors as a class could be
offset by the underpayment of settlors as a class if there is some overlap between
these two classes. The extent of the overlap is hard to gauge, but among those who
settle there probably would be a higher percentage of uninsured, non-institutional per-
sons, who pass this way but once or twice, than among those who do not settle. If
there were two defendants, one insured and one uninsured, the plaintiff might well set-
tle with the latter for what he could get, regardless of his per capita share, knowing
that the insured defendant would be liable for the rest. Of course, if the plaintiff's esti-
mate of what could be extracted from the uninsured defendant was accurate, the
insurer has lost nothing. But the presence of insurance removes a substantial incentive
for the plaintiff to pursue the non-insured defendant with much vigor. Good faith does
not require the plaintiff to subordinate his own interests to that of the insurer.
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lems can be avoided by reducing the plaintiff's recovery, and the
non-settling defendant's liability, by the shares of the negligence at-
tributable to those who have settled.' 7 The advantage of this ap-
proach from a process point of view is that it puts pressure upon
the plaintiff to make a more realistic assessment of a defendant's
ability to pay before settling; the plaintiff, not the other defendants,
bears the risk of a bad settlement. It also avoids the need to inquire
into the good faith of the plaintiff, a difficult issue at best in all but
the clearest of cases.
In theory, too, the reduction of the plaintiff's recovery by the
share of the settling defendant's negligence, rather than by the
dollar amount of the settlement, is preferable. There is a logical con-
sistency in measuring each defendant's liability by his share of the
negligence in instances of settlement as well as in cases in which
liability is determined by verdict and judgment. And, if the settle-
ment were undervalued, reduction of the liability of the other defen-
dants only by the dollar amount of the settlement would require
each to pay in excess of his share of the negligence, a result incon-
sistent with the idea of comparative negligence."8
CONCLUSION
Comparative negligence has considerable appeal. While it re-
tains fault as a basis for liability at a time when we do not appear
ready to abandon it as a principal rule of accident loss allocation," 9 it
107. See Rogers v. Spady, 147 N.J. Super. 274, 371 A.2d 285 (1977). Implicit in this
approach is the inclusion of the negligence of a person who has settled in the pool of
negligence which is used to determine the shares of negligence of the parties. In the
discussion throughout this article relating to whose negligence is counted for the pur-
pose of share determination, no reference is made to the negligence of settlors, but
such negligence should be included.
108. See subsection entitled "Loss Apportionment Between Defendants," supra.
The settlor who pays an amount in excess of his share of the negligence presents no
problem unique to comparative negligence. The usual rule outside of comparative
negligence is that a settlor who pays more than his per capita share is entitled to con-
tribution to the extent of the excess from those tortfeasors who have not settled. See,
e.g., Wages v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Ga. App. 79, 208 S.E.2d 1 (1974).
The concept of comparative negligence does not suggest a different result although it
is arguably more appropriate to permit contribution based on the settling person's
share of the negligence, rather than upon the dollar amount of the settlement.
109. No-fault automobile insurance no longer seems a pressing issue; and, while
half the states have no-fault legislation, no such statute has been adopted in the past three
years. Even in workers' compensation, the no-fault principle is being undercut by per-
mitting recovery by injured workers for negligent machinery design against manufac-
turers of machinery used on the job, see Cavazos v. E.W. Bliss Co., 394 N.E.2d 438 (Ill.
App. 1979); Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 404 A.2d 1094 (N.H. 1979), and the availability,
in some states, of contribution by third party defendants against otherwise immune
employers, see, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
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avoids the seeming harshness of barring all recovery by a negligent
plaintiff. However, accepting the concept of comparative negligence
is but the first step; what is a relatively simple idea involves a great
deal of complexity in translating that concept into a concrete plan
for loss apportionment."' This article surveys the principal methods
of apportioning loss through comparative negligence. What this
writer views as the central theme of comparative negligence-that
loss should be apportioned according to shares of negligence-has
applications across a wide range of apportionment issues. These
issues relate not only to how the plaintiff's recovery should be af-
fected by his negligence, but also to how that recovery should be
distributed among others whose negligence has contributed to the
loss. At a number of points in this article, alternatives which seem
most consistent with that theme have been suggested. However,
practical politics as much as logic will often influence the course of
legislation.' And, of course, the existence of conflicting notions of
good policy make compromise inevitable. For these reasons, it is not
always possible for a legislature to provide answers to all the prob-
lems that must, sooner or later, be addressed. But an effective legis-
lative process requires an awareness of these problems so that the
most intelligent and acceptable choices can be made. This article
should help to focus upon these choices with respect to the methods
by which losses can be apportioned under comparative negligence.
110. This complexity has led a number of courts to defer to legislative process for
the abrogation of the common law rule of contributory negligence. See, e.g., Maki v.
Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co.,
86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974). Certainly, the amount of litigation that would be re-
quired to work out the problems covered in this article on a case-by-case basis would
be enormous. Even when courts have acted initially, legislatures may feel the neces-
sity to alter or fill in the courts' schemes. See Fleming, supra note 46.
1 111. This is why many advocates of law reform prefer courts to legislatures: ideo-
logical purity is easier to achieve.
[Vol. 40
